Electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters

0542972 - NHÚ 2022 RIV US eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Matějka, Filip - Tabellini, G.
Electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters.
Journal of the European Economic Association. Roč. 19, č. 3 (2021), s. 1899-1935. ISSN 1542-4766. E-ISSN 1542-4774
GRANT EU: European Commission(XE) 678081 - INATTENTION
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985998
Klíčová slova: electoral competition * rationally inattentive voters
Obor OECD: Economic Theory
Impakt faktor: 4.301, rok: 2021
Způsob publikování: Open access
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa042

This paper studies how voters’ selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, that divisive issues attract most attention, and that public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing opportunistic candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0320286