Počet záznamů: 1
Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining
- 1. 0423393 - NHU-C 2015 RIV NL eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Celik, Levent - Karabay, Bilgehan - McLaren, J.
Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining.
Journal of International Economics. Roč. 91, č. 2 (2013), s. 179-190. ISSN 0022-1996
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GAP402/12/0666
Grant ostatní:UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012
Institucionální podpora: PRVOUK-P23
Klíčová slova: trade policy * multilateral legislative bargaining * political economy
Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
Impakt faktor: 2.443, rok: 2013
In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0229484