Počet záznamů: 1  

Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

  1. 1. 0399708 - NHU-N 2014 RIV NL eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
    Celik, Levent - Karabay, B. - McLaren, J.
    Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining.
    Journal of International Economics. Roč. 91, č. 2 (2013), s. 179-190 ISSN 0022-1996
    Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985998
    Klíčová slova: trade policy * multilateral legislative bargaining * political economy
    Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
    Impakt faktor: 2.443, rok: 2013

    In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff.
    Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0227464
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